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Abstract 
Thinking about how other people represent objects in the world around them is thought to require deliberate 
effort.  In recent years, interactive “joint action” paradigms have shown how social context can affect our 
cognitive processing.  We tested whether people would represent their partner’s point of view in a simple team 
game.  Participants played a game in which they had to judge the magnitude of a number either sat alone, or 
opposite a partner.  Importantly they were never asked to judge their partner’s point of view.  Remarkably, when 
playing the game as a team, people were better when their partner happened to share their view of the number, 
such as when seeing a number 8, than when their partner viewed the number to be different, such as when 
seeing a number 6 that looked like a number 9 to their partner.  In two further experiments, we identified the 
conditions under which the effect was present.  Experiment two showed that the effect was only present after 
observing the prior involvement of one’s partner in the task.  Experiment 3, showed that the aspect of the 
stimulus (its magnitude) that participants were sensitive to did not need to be the aspect of the stimulus to which 
their partner was paying attention. 
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Human beings have evolved to live in complex social worlds and we rely on our ability to cooperate to achieve 
common goals (Tomasello, 2008). We are naturally predisposed towards teaching and learning important 
information from others (Csibra & Gergely, 2009) and show continued sensitivity to their belief-like states from 
infancy (Schneider, Bayliss, Becker, & Dux, 2012; Kovács , Téglás  & Endress, 2010; Onishi & Baillergeon, 
2005). These propositions imply a sensitivity to the points of view of other people, which under some 
circumstances may be detrimental to focusing on our own perspective. Research on joint action has focussed on 
how we incorporate another’s goals with our own (Sebanz, Knoblich & Prinz, 2003).  Research on perspective-
taking has focussed on how we represent the perspectives of others when they are different from our own 
(Flavell, Everett, Croft & Flavell, 1981; Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews & 
Bodley-Scott, 2010).  In this paper, we combine these strands and use an interactive task to test whether we 
compute other people’s perspectives even when there is no explicit goal to do so.  The rationale behind this is 
that if joint task contexts predispose us to be aware of other people’s perspectives, it should affect us regardless 
of whether we have an explicit goal to take into account how they see the world. 
 
Perspective-taking 
Even if two people jointly attend to a single object, they may see the object in different ways (Piaget & Inhelder, 
1956).  Developmental psychologists consider this to be level-2 perspective-taking, as distinct from level-1 
perspective taking, which is the ability to know if another person can see a given object or not (Flavell et al., 
1981; Masangkay, et al., 1974).  The distinction between level-1 and level-2 perspective-taking has regularly 
been proposed to mark a significant landmark in our perspective-taking abilities (Apperly & Butterfill, 2010; 
Flavell et al., 1981; Surtees, Butterfill & Apperly, 2012).  Children’s level-2 perspective-taking develops 
relatively late, at around the age of 4 (Flavell et al., 1981, Masangkay et al., 1974). Interestingly, level-2 abilities 
develop at the same age at which children first begin to understand about false beliefs on standard tasks 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and the difference between appearance and reality (Flavell, 1986).  Level-2 
perspective-taking has yet to be shown in non-human animals (Call & Tomasello, 2008), adding further weight 
to the notion of it being a cognitively effortful activity, or requiring complex concepts.  In two previous studies, 
we tested whether children and adults automatically take other people’s level-2 perspectives (Surtees et al., 
2012; Surtees, Apperly & Samson, under review).  When presented with stimuli of an avatar in a room, children 
and adults showed no systematic detrimental effect in self-perspective performance when the avatar saw a 
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numeral to be different to how they, themselves, saw it (for example a 6 which appears as a 9 for the avatar; 
Surtees et al., 2012).  This contrasts with findings from level-1 perspective-taking, which show children and 
adults to be automatically influenced by how many objects an avatar can see when making judgements about 
how many objects they, themselves, can see (Samson et al., 2010; Surtees & Apperly, 2012).  This suggests that 
level-2 perspective-taking requires controlled processing, using executive resources (Surtees et al., 2012). 
However, even if level-2 perspective-taking is not automatic, and requires costly executive resources, people 
clearly do engage in this form of perspective-taking when necessary.  The current study looks at whether 
situations involving joint goals and joint attention provide sufficient circumstances for adults to adopt someone 
else’s perspective spontaneously. 
 
Social facilitation 
While developmental psychologists identified an inherent difficulty for individuals in explicitly judging the 
perspectives of other people, social psychologists have for more than a century identified ways in which people 
adapt their performance in the presence of others without any obvious reason for doing so (Triplett, 1897; 
Zajonc, 1965).  In Triplett’s (1897) seminal studies, the mere presence of another person was shown to cause 
participants to perform better than when they were alone.  Such facilitation is not limited to humans, with rats 
(Zentall & Levine, 1972) and chickens (Tolman, 1967) actively pursuing food more persistently when in the 
presence of others, suggesting that this is not the result of higher order social reasoning.  Social presence does 
not always improve performance; in fact it can directly hinder it.  Individual performance has been shown to get 
worse (Social loafing) when it is evaluated on whether participants complete a joint goal or when they complete 
a more complex task (Aiello & Douthwitt, 2001).  The most influential explanation of this pattern of 
performance has been through Zajonc’s (1965) proposal that social presence increases drive or arousal and that 
this improves performance of dominant actions and reduces performance of non-dominant actions.  Alternative 
proposals have been that social presence facilities through behavioural imitation or mimicry (Cheng & 
Chartrand, 2003), through social comparison (Cottrell, 1972) or through cognitive appraisal (Baron, 1986). 
While research on social facilitation has taken place for more than a hundred years, early interest failed to make 
a distinction between the effect of the presence of an audience and another active participant (Zajonc, 1956). 
Most relevantly to research on perspective-taking, social facilitation theories have tended to investigate solely 
the magnitude of performance, rather than whether social facilitation can prompt social understanding between 
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people.  As regards to this, recent research on joint action and joint attention has looked more specifically at 
how the goals and intentions of active partners can influence one another. 
 
Joint action/perception. 
When people interact with others towards a common goal, they often perform differently to when they complete 
a task independently (Richardson, Dale & Kirkham, 2007; Sebanz et al., 2003; Shteynberg & Galinsky, 2011; 
Spivey, 2007).  Sebanz et al. (2003) demonstrated this in “the Social Simon effect”.  In a classic Simon task 
(Simon, 1969), people respond to a visual dimension of a stimulus (its colour) while ignoring the spatial 
dimension of the stimulus (its appearance on the left or right side of the screen).  Participants are affected by the 
spatial dimension of the task when they make a left-right choice response, but not when they respond (go) to one 
colour and withhold a response (no-go) to the other.  In the Social Simon, participants perform the go/no-go 
version of the Simon task with a partner, each responding to a different colour.  In these conditions, the 
influence of the spatial dimension reappears, suggesting that people represent the goal of the task as a joint goal, 
rather than merely representing their own part of the task.  
The effect of social interaction on cognitive and perceptual processing has also been noted when people engage 
in conversation.  In a series of studies, Richardson and colleagues (Richardson, Dale & Kirkham, 2007; 
Richardson et al., 2012) have shown that individuals adjust their visual experience to maximise the common 
ground between them.  Long a central component of social theories of language and communication (Clark, 
1996; Sperber & Wilson, 1986), the pervasiveness of common ground has been challenged by work suggesting 
people don’t have immediate access to the referents of others (Keysar et al., 2003).  However, work examining 
the looking behaviour of adults has suggested a remarkable convergence between the eye gaze patterns of 
communication partners (Richardson & Dale, 2005).  Groups of participants will look at a relevant individual 
when a stereotyped trait is mentioned by another communicator, but only if they believe that that person can 
also hear the comment (Crosby, Monin & Richardson, 2008).  Similarly, people coincide in their eye gaze to 
well-known characters being described by a partner (Richardson & Dale, 2005).  Shteynburg and colleagues 
have made similar progress in discerning how and when an individual will adapt their aims and goals to that of a 
similar other.  Pairs of participants who believe that they have experienced instructions in common with similar 
others will learn to adapt their conversational style (Shteynberg &Apfelbaum, 2013) and will adjust their aims to 
a more cautious miss-reduction strategy or more speculative hit-maximisation strategy when they believe that a 
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similar other has also received that instruction (Shteynberg & Galinsky, 2011).  Shteynberg and colleagues’ 
results (Shteynberg & Apfelbaum, 2013; Shteynerg & Galinsky, 2011) suggest that, not only do we look to 
minimise discrepancies between the experience of ourselves and similar others, but that we will actively adopt a 
strategy in common with a partner’s even if we do not have a common goal.  However, evidence that individuals 
look to increase common ground (Garrod & Pickering, 2008), maximise shared experience and adopt joint 
strategy and learning opportunities does not address the question of how people deal with situations in which 
ground, experience or strategy are not in common; that is to say, when partners differ in their perspectives.  
Thus, this literature also leads to the question of the conditions under which partners are sensitive to each other’s 
perspectives.  
 
Böckler and colleagues (Böckler, Knoblich & Sebanz, 2011; Böckler & Sebanz, 2012; Böckler & Zwickel; 
2012) extended the methods of joint action studies to consider joint perception.  Böckler et al (2011) presented 
participants with pictures of two hands sequentially.  Participants were asked whether the second hand was the 
same (left or right) hand as the first.  Crucially, for half of the trials (the alone condition), the partner closed 
their eyes.  For the other half, they had their eyes open (the joint condition).  When the second hand was 120-
180° rotated away from the participant’s own body orientation, performance was better in the joint than the 
alone condition.  At 0-60° performance was better in the alone condition. This pattern suggested that 
participants were shifting towards more allocentric than egocentric encoding when another person was present. 
Joint perception has also been found to modulate neural activity; Böckler & Zwickel (2012) identified 
significantly increased N170 and N250 effects when participants sat opposite a partner while viewing pictures of 
faces.  Modulation of the N170 and N250 is typically associated with the recruitment of extra resources for face 
processing.  This suggests that the mere presence of a partner who sees an inverted face may require extra effort 
to process stimuli that look the right way up.  Taken together, these studies imply that the presence of another 
person can change how we encode a stimulus.  In all cases, participants seemed to encode stimuli less 
egocentrically: losing the advantage for upright faces (Böckler & Zwickel, 2012) and for hands presented 
aligned with their own body (Böckler et al., 2011).  Importantly, these tasks did not test whether participants 
were sensitive to the content of their partner’s perspective.  In all cases, regardless of orientation, partners 
shared a perspective: both partners saw the same hand or the same face.  Therefore, they are informative about 
how others influence whether we adopt allocentric or egocentric spatial encoding strategies, but do not address 
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the kind of perspective conflict highlighted by Piaget & Inhelder (1956) and others as being indicative of social 
understanding. 
 
The current work 
Our interest was to investigate whether adults would spontaneously adopt a partner’s level-2 perspective when 
working together in an interactive task setting.  To do this, we used simple numerals.  If a number 6 is looked at 
upside down it appears to be a number 9.  We were interested in whether participants’ own performance at 
processing the number would be affected by a partner who saw the same stimulus to be the same number or to 
be a different number.  In order to produce a cooperative context participants were cued to make eye contact 
before every trial (Csibra, 2010 notes that eye contact is a strong cue that an interactive situation is about to take 
place), and told that they were working as a team. 
As level-2 perspective taking has been found to be effortful (Surtees et al., 2012), we might expect the other 
person’s perspective to have no impact on participants’ processing of the stimuli, for the other person’s 
perspective is not relevant to their task at hand.  Alternatively, because we require participants to actively 
engage with another person, one might predict participants to show a performance pattern consistent with being 
sensitive to the other’s point of view. Specifically, in this case, numbers such as 6 and 9, which appear different 
to their partner in the task, should be more difficult to judge than numbers such as 8 and 5 that look the same to 
their partner in the task. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Participants. 
Thirty-two students at the Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium, participated for a small honorarium. The 
sample included 21 females and had an average age of 21.7. The majority of participants were white European. 
One pair of participants was tested, but not included in the final sample because of equipment failure. 
Design and Procedure. 
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Participants took part in one of two conditions (Alone, Joint). Within each condition, participants were further 
divided into groups (Red, Blue). In the alone condition, participants sat on one side of a flat-lying monitor 
facing an empty chair that faced away from them. In the joint condition, two participants faced one another from 
either side of the screen (see figure 1). In both conditions, participants responded only to the relevant coloured 
numbers for their condition (red or blue), with both participants data used in the final analysis. In all conditions, 
participants’ tasks were the same: they had to judge whether a number presented on the screen was bigger than, 
or smaller than 7. Participants in the red group responded with a computer mouse placed on their lap and clicked 
the left mouse button to respond that the number on the screen was smaller than 7 and the right mouse button to 
respond that the number on the screen was bigger than 7. Participants in the blue group had a keyboard placed 
on their lap. They clicked the “d” key for smaller than 7 and the “k” key for larger than 7. In both cases 
participants responded to smaller numbers with a left response and larger numbers with a right response. Most 
important to note, though, is that in all cases response type was entirely balanced across the alone and joint 
conditions. Regardless of whether participants found it easier to respond for one method of responding, or to one 
colour of stimuli, these effects would be balanced across our conditions of interest. Participants’ holding the 
mouse/keyboard on their laps meant that the other participant did not see their responses, so there could be no 
contamination from observing the spatial responses of the partner. 
 
Participants viewed 16 practice trials, followed by 256 experimental trials, divided into 4 blocks.  On each trial, 
participants first of all saw a fixation cross and heard two beeps. A high frequency beep cued them to look up 
from the screen. Participants in the joint condition made eye contact with their partner, participants in the alone 
condition looked at a coloured star placed at eye level. A low frequency beep cued them to look back at the 
fixation cross. Following this, a number appeared on the screen and participants made their response.  Each 
number (5, 6, 8, 9) was presented equally often, half the time in each colour (Red, Blue). The number 8 and the 
number 5 (in the chosen fonts) appear to be the same number if viewed from the opposite direction- so were 
considered  Consistent. The number 6 and the number 9, however, look like one another if viewed upside down- 
so were considered Inconsistent.  Each condition contained one number only 1 place away from the reference 
number 7 and one number 2 places away, so the discrepancy between stimulus and reference numbers was equal 
across all conditions. Regardless of when a response was made, the number disappeared after one second. This 
ensured that participants in all conditions were exposed to the stimuli for an equal length of time. 
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Figure 1. Representation of the method of Experiment 1. Only in Inconsistent-Joint trials is there a perspective 
discrepancy: A sees a 9, whilst B sees a 6. For Consistent-joint, both A and B see an 8. For Consistent -Alone, A 
sees an 8, whilst in the Inconsistent-Alone, A sees a 9. 
 
Results 
Responses from both participants were used for the analysis. We completed separate 2 (Condition) x 2 
(Consistency) ANOVAs for Response Times and Accuracy. For the Alone condition, the stimuli were never 
“Consistent” or “Inconsistent” as such, so these condition labels refer to the consistency of the number if viewed 
by a person opposite. A main effect of Condition represents the consequences of the presence of a partner. A 
main effect of Consistency represents a basic difference in the ease of judging the different numbers. Our 
critical interest was in whether we observed an interaction between Consistency and Condition, which would 
suggest that the presence of a partner altered the processing of consistent versus inconsistent stimuli. 
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Response Times  
Only correct responses were included in the analysis of response times. There was no main effect of Condition, 
F(1, 30) =  .336,  p = .536, ηp2 = .011, and no main effect of Consistency F(1, 30) = 1.826, p = .187, ηp2 = .057. 
Crucially, there was an interaction between Consistency and Condition F(1, 30) = 8.948, p = .006, ηp2= .230, 
see figure 2. Follow up t-tests showed this interaction to reflect a significant effect of Consistency in the Joint 
Condition, t(15) = 2.663, p = 0.0181; Consistent < Inconsistent, but no significant effect in the Alone condition, 
t(15) = 1.417, p = .177.  
To review whether the difference was more likely to reflect facilitation or interference we further analysed the 
data by comparing mean response time for each of the groups within Consistent and Inconsistent conditions. 
This revealed no effect in either the Consistent, t(30) = 1.189, p = .244, or the Inconsistent, t(30) = .007, p = 
.994, condition. 
 
Errors 
For this analysis, responses where participants did not respond within the time limit were coded as incorrect.  A 
logistic regression was undertaken in line with Jaeger (2008), to model Accuracy, with Condition, Consistency, 
Participant (nested within Condition) and the interaction between Consistency and Condition being entered as 
predictors.  The model differed significantly from a constant only model, χ2 (33, N = 32) =  303.74 , p < .001.  
The Wald Criteria for Consistency, Z = 10.17, p = .001, Consistent < Inconsistent, Condition, Z = 4.82, p = .028, 
Consistent < Inconsistent, and the Consistency by Condition interaction, Z = 9.55, p = .002, were significant. 
The interaction was understood by the odds ratio for the effect of Consistency in the Alone condition being 1.01 
and in the joint condition being 2.22, meaning that there was little effect of Consistency on Accuracy when 
                                                          
1 The data were further analysed to investigate whether the effect was modulated by the pairing in which they 
participated to consider the alternative hypothesis that effect sizes were increased by a small number of pairs in 
which both partners showed a large consistency effect.  The effect of Consistency remained when the pairing in 
which each person participated was included in a further analysis, F (7, 8) = 9.168, p = .666 . There was no 
main effect of Pairing,  F(1, 8) =  2.276, p = .136, ηp2 = .534 and no interaction between Pairing and 
Consistency, F(7, 8) =  1.629, p = .254, ηp2 = .588.  
11 
 
completing the task alone, but errors being more than doubled for Inconsistent trials when completing the task 
with a partner. 
 
 
Figure 2. Results of Experiment 1. Response times and error proportions across the alone and joint condition as 
a function of perspective consistency. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.   
 
Experiment 1 produced an intriguing novel finding. When participating alone, there was no difference in 
performance between numbers that looked the same if inverted and numbers that looked different.  When 
working opposite a partner, however, performance was worse for those numbers that looked different from a 
partner’s point of view.  We propose that participants were spontaneously sensitive to their partner’s perspective 
and that this made judging the value of the number easier when this was consistent and more difficult when it 
was inconsistent.  This novel finding is consistent with a range of work showing the influence of other people on 
how we process information (Böckler, Knoblich & Sebanz, 2011; Böckler & Sebanz, 2012; Böckler & Zwickel; 
2012, Richardson et al., 2012).  Further analysis could not determine whether this effect was better described as 
poor performance on inconsistent trials resulting from interference (Samson et al. 2010) or better performance 
on consistent trials resulting from facilitation (Shteynberg, 2010). 
 
Experiment 1 leaves open questions about the conditions under which this perspective-taking takes place. 
Participants never responded to the same trial since each only responded to the stimuli of a specific pre-assigned 
colour.  Thus perspective-taking occurred even though the stimulus was not relevant to the other partner.  
However, both participants participated within the same block of trials and were thus both actively engaged in 
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the task.  The first question this raises is whether it is enough just to have another person present whose view 
differs from our own?  Or, does the other person have to be actively involved in the task? Experiment 2 
addresses this first issue by having participants perform the task sequentially across blocks of trials, rather than 
simultaneously within blocks of trials.  Secondly, in Experiment 1, both partners share the same task goal, 
namely judging the number magnitude.  However, does the other person need to share the same goal as us?  
Experiment 3 addresses this second issue by having pairs of participants with different goals, because their task 
was to judge different aspects of the stimuli. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
One interpretation of the findings of Experiment 1 is that participants “got their partner’s number” simply 
because there was someone sat opposite them who saw the stimulus the same or differently from how they did. 
Tversky and Hard (2010) found that even in simple picture stimuli, people’s responses about spatial locations 
were changed by the irrelevant presence of another person.  By this view, the mere presence of another, even if 
that person is not actively involved in the task, should be enough to promote spontaneous perspective-taking.  In 
Experiment 2 we examined this hypothesis by having pairs of participants complete the same task as in 
Experiment 1, but in distinct halves, where one’s partner was present, but did not act on the stimuli during the 
entire half of the task.  By the mere presence hypothesis, we should replicate the consistency effect of 
Experiment 1 in both partners of the task.  In contrast, if the partner needs to be actively and concurrently 
involved in the task (simultaneous involvement hypothesis), then we should not find the consistency effect in 
any of the partners.  We also considered an intermediate hypothesis according to which the prior experience of 
the other person’s involvement in the task rather than the partner’s actual concurrent involvement in the task 
may suffice.  On this account, spontaneous perspective-taking could be triggered by the mere observation of 
another person performing the joint task.  As long as the other has not yet performed the task, there would be no 
perspective-taking.  By this observation account, we should only find a consistency effect in the partner who 
performs the task second as this is the only partner who observed the other performing the task before.     
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Method 
We tested pairs of participants who completed the same basic task as in Experiment 1 sequentially, with one 
participant responding in the first half of the experiment and another in the second. We also tested participants 
individually so as to have a statistical comparison for any joint action effects. 
Participants. 
48 students at the Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium, participated for a small honorarium, none of 
whom had participated in Experiment 1. The sample included 35 females and had an average age of 20.81. The 
majority of participants were white European. 
Design and Procedure. 
The basic procedure here was identical to that in Experiment 1. Sixteen participants took part alone, while 32 
formed pairs. In this case the pair were further divided such that one member of each pair was allocated to the 
Joint-First condition and one to the Joint-Second condition. As in Experiment 1, participants were further 
divided, equally, on whether they would make judgements about red or blue numbers. In the Alone condition 
participants saw 8 practice trials followed by 128 experimental trials. Unlike in Experiment 1, they only saw 
numbers of the appropriate colour, so responded to every number they saw, so as to match the demands in the 
joint condition. In every other way, this condition matched the alone condition of Experiment 1. The paired 
participants were instructed that they were working as a team, but would take turns being the player and the 
observer. The first player (in the Joint-First condition) completed 8 practice trials followed by 128 experimental 
trials. These trials showed only one colour, but in all other ways matched the joint condition of Experiment 1 
(beeping, eye contact etc.). Following this, the second player (in the Joint-Second condition) completed 8 
practice trials followed by 128 experimental trials of the other colour. Note that as in Experiment 1, the 
examined trials were identical for all conditions. Our design meant an equal number of participants responded to 
each colour and with each response map in each of the three conditions and responded to an equal number of 
consistent and inconsistent numbers.  
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Results 
We completed separate 3 (Condition) x 2 (Consistency) ANOVAs for Response Times and Accuracy. For the 
Alone condition, the stimuli were never “Consistent” or “Inconsistent” as such, so these condition labels refer to 
the consistency of the number if it had been viewed by a person opposite.  
Response Times  
Only correct responses were included in the analysis of response times. There was a main effect of Consistency, 
F(1, 45) = 5.91,  p = .019, ηp2 = .116, but no main effect of Condition F(2, 45) = 1.33, p = .274, ηp2 = .056. 
Crucially, there was an interaction between Consistency and Condition F(2, 45) = 4.48, p = .017, ηp2= .166, see 
figure 3. Follow up t-tests showed this interaction to reflect a significant effect of Consistency in the Joint-
Second Condition, t(15) = 4.073, p = .001; Consistent < Inconsistent, but neither in the Alone condition t(15) = 
.099, p =922, nor in the Joint-First condition, t(15) = .440, p = .666.  
Further analysis to examine whether the effects were more likely the result of facilitation or interference 
evidenced no difference between conditions in either Consistent, F(2, 45) = .722, p = .491, or Inconsistent F(2, 
45) = .2.226, p = .120, conditions. 
Errors 
 As for experiment 1, responses where participants did not respond within the time limit were coded as 
incorrect. Accuracy rates were generally high (Ranged between 95% and 97%).  A logistic regression was 
undertaken, to model Accuracy, with Condition, Consistency, Participant (nested within Condition) and the 
interaction between the two being entered as predictors.  The model differed significantly from a constant only 
model, χ2(50, N = 48) = 338.68, p = .001.  The Wald Criterion for neither Condition, Z < .001, p = 1.00, 
Consistency, Z = .918, p =.34, nor the interaction between the two, Z = 1.06, p =.59.  
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Figure 3. Results of Experiment 2. Response times and error proportions across the alone and joint conditions as 
a function of perspective consistency. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.   
 
In Experiment 2, we advanced our knowledge of the scope of spontaneous perspective-taking. 
Completing the task in separate halves, rather than simultaneously, changed the effect in that the first member of 
the team to undertake the task was no longer sensitive to their partner’s perspective, instead performing as if 
they were alone.  However, when the second member of the team participated, the effect of consistency was 
restored.  This pattern suggests that the mere presence of another person is not enough to evoke spontaneous 
processing of the partner’s perspective.  It also shows that the simultaneous involvement of the partner is not 
necessary to trigger spontaneous perspective-taking as long as the partner has played an active role before.  
These results suggest that observation of a partner in a joint task can be enough to activate a joint-task context 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Experiment 3 examined whether partners need to share the same task goal for spontaneous perspective-taking to 
occur. Thus, in the critical condition, pairs of participants completed different tasks with the same stimuli. One 
partner judged number magnitude (as in the previous experiments) and the other judged a surface feature 
(spotted or plain) of the numbers presented.  Note that, although the number identity was sometimes different 
depending on which partner looked at it (i.e., this was the case for the inconsistent numbers 6 and 9), the surface 
feature of the numbers (spotted or plain) was always the same from both points of view.  This means that the 
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consistency factor used throughout this series of experiments was directly relevant to the judgement made in the 
magnitude task, but not the features task. 
Predictions for magnitude judgments 
If the team member judging magnitude shows no consistency effect (meaning that she finds it as easy to judge 8 
and 5 relative to 7 than 6 and 9 relative to 7), then this means that there is no evidence of spontaneous 
perspective-taking, and indicates that spontaneous perspective-taking necessitates that both partners share the 
same goal (e.g. evaluating number magnitude, like in Experiments 1 and 2). On the other hand, if the 
consistency effect persists, then this means that spontaneous perspective-taking occurs even for stimulus aspects 
that are not part of the other person’s task goal. 
Predictions for judging surface features 
The “consistency” of stimuli was independent of the task that was completed by the team member who judged 
the surface features of the stimuli.  Any effect would, for example, demonstrate better performance at judging 
the spottiness of a number 8 than a number 6.  It would therefore, show that perspective consistency affects 
performance even for tasks where the stimulus aspect is not relevant to our goal (e.g. our partner seeing a 6 
when we see a 9 slows us down, even when our task is to judge the number as spotted).  This could perhaps be 
seen as some form of startle effect, rather than one specific to perspective-taking.  The absence of an effect of 
number magnitude would be more difficult to interpret.  One interpretation would be that we only take other 
people’s perspectives spontaneously on aspects that are relevant to our own task.  Another is that we always take 
other people’s perspective in joint tasks, but our responses are only affected if they relate to the aspect that may 
produce conflict.  
 
Method 
Participants either participated alone, or opposite a partner. The key difference from Experiments 1 and 2 was 
that here participants in the joint condition completed different tasks. One participant judged the magnitude of 
the number, while the other judged a superficial feature of the stimulus (whether it was spotted or plain, see 
figure 4).  Partners were aware that they would each be paying attention to a different stimulus feature.  
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Participants 
48 students at the Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium, participated for a small honorarium. The sample 
included 28 females and had an average age of 22.5. None of the participants had taken part in Experiment 1 or 
2. The majority of participants were white European. Two pairs of participants were tested but not included in 
the final sample as one of the pair performed below chance. 
 
Stimuli 
Half of the stimuli used were identical to those used in Experiments 1 and 2, red and blue numbers {5, 6, 8, 9}. 
The other half of the stimuli were created by adding a number of small white circles to each of the numbers (see 
figure 4). This led to a final total of 16 picture stimuli. 
 
Design and Procedure 
One third of participants completed the task alone, completing the same basic task as in Experiment 1. This 
meant seeing 256 stimuli, 128 of which required a response. The other two thirds took part in pairs. One 
member of each pair was put in the Joint-Feature condition and the other in the Joint-Magnitude condition. A 
pair of participants saw 256 trials. As in Experiment 1, each participant was given a colour of number to respond 
to (red or blue). Participants in the Joint-Magnitude condition completed the task in the same way as Experiment 
1, responding if the number was bigger or smaller than 7. Participants in the Joint-Feature condition completed a 
new task requiring them to respond as to whether the number was spotty or plain (see figure 4). This meant that, 
for example, participant A might be judging whether the red numbers were bigger or smaller than 7 and working 
with participant B who was judging if the blue numbers were spotty or plain. As in the previous experiments, 
colour of number and response method were controlled across conditions. 
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Figure 4: Method for Experiment 3. Consistency relates only to the number magnitude since the pattern feature 
is always consistent across perspectives. The team member in the Joint-Magnitude condition has to judge 
whether the stimulus is smaller or larger than 7, their partner’s perspective on the magnitude of the number may 
be consistent with or inconsistent with theirs. The team member in the Joint-Feature condition has to judge 
whether the stimulus is spotted or plain, their partner’s perspective on the number magnitude may be different 
from theirss, but their view on the surface features of the number are equivalent.  
 
Results 
We completed separate 3 (Condition) x 2 (Consistency) ANOVAs for Response Times and Accuracy. As in 
Experiments 1 and 2, the crucial test was the interaction between Consistency and Condition. 
 
Response Times 
Only correct responses were included in the analysis of response times. There was a main effect of Consistency, 
F(1, 45) = 6.334,  p = .015, ηp2 = .123, but no main effect of Condition F(2, 45) = .097, p = .907, ηp2 = .004. 
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Crucially, there was an interaction between Consistency and Condition F(2, 45) = 3.330, p = .045, ηp2= .129, 
see figure 5. Follow up t-tests showed this interaction to reflect a significant effect of Consistency in the Joint-
Magnitude Condition, t(15) = 2.842, p = .012; Consistent < Inconsistent, but neither in the Alone condition t(15) 
= .559, p = .584, nor in the Joint-Feature condition, t(15) = .376, p = .712.  
 
As with Experiments 1 and 2, further analysis to examine whether the effects were more likely the result of 
facilitation or interference evidenced no difference between conditions in either Consistent, F(2, 45) = .180, p = 
.836, or Inconsistent F(2, 45) = .276, p = .760, conditions. 
 
Errors 
For this analysis, responses where participants did not respond within the time limit were coded as incorrect. 
Accuracy rates were generally high (Ranged between 90% and 96%). A logistic regression was undertaken to 
model Accuracy, with Condition, Consistency, Participant (nested within condition) and the interaction between 
Condition and Consistency being entered as predictors.  The model differed significantly from a constant only 
model, χ2(50, N = 48) = 395.42, p < .001.  The Wald Criterion for Consistency, Z = 4.31, p = .038, Consistent < 
Inconsistent was significant, but for Condition was not, Z = 3.35, p =.187.  The interaction effect was 
significant, Z = 9.01, p = .011. The interaction was understood by the odds ratio for the effect of Consistency in 
the Joint Numerical condition implicating that errors were 72% more likely on Inconsistent trials, OR = 1.72;  in 
the Alone condition, errors were 39 % more likely on Inconsistent trials, OR = 1.39; in the Joint Features 
condition errors were 17 % less likely on Inconsistent trials.  
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Figure 5.  Results of Experiment 3. Response times and error proportions across the alone and joint conditions 
as a function of perspective consistency. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. Consistency refers 
to each partner’s perspective on the number and whether they converge. The superficial features of the number, 
directly relevant to the Joint Feature condition are always consistent to all participants. 
 
Ours results suggest that spontaneous perspective-taking does occur for stimulus aspects relevant to our own 
goal, even when our partner’s goal is not the same as ours.  For example, when we see a spotted number 9, it is 
harder to judge that the number is bigger than 7 when our partner sees the number to be a 6 rather than a 9, 
despite the fact that magnitude is irrelevant to their task.  As highlighted earlier, the absence of the number 
magnitude effect when the partner judges whether the number is spotted or plain is less straightforward to 
interpret and we will return to this issue in the General Discussion.  
 
General Discussion 
We tested the degree to which adults were spontaneously sensitive to the perspective of how an object looked to 
another person in an interactive task.  When participants completed the task on their own, they were equally 
efficient at judging the magnitude of the numbers 8 and 5, as judging the magnitude of the numbers 9 and 6.  
When they performed the same task in a pair, however, their responses were faster on trials in which their 
perspective was consistent with that of their partner than on trials in which their perspective was inconsistent 
with that of their partner.  We suggest that the reason for this was that they were spontaneously sensitive to how 
the numbers looked to their partner.  In Experiment 2, we showed that this was not the result of the mere 
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presence of another person, for participants did not spontaneously take the perspective of a partner who had yet 
to take part in the task.  Here, the prior observation of the active role of the partner was required for participants 
to take the other’s perspective.  Experiment 3 showed that the partners did not need to do exactly the same task.  
Perspective-taking occurred even when a partner did an irrelevant task.  
Previous studies have shown that someone’s performance on a task can be affected by the presence of another 
person, even though the task does not require considering their point of view (Böckler et al., 2011, Sebanz et al., 
2003; Tversky & Hard, 2010).  This is strong evidence that we process a scene more globally in the presence of 
another whose general viewpoint differs from our own (Böckler et al., 2011; Conson, Mazzarella, Donnarumma 
& Trojano, 2012; Tversky & Hard, 2010), known as allocentric encoding.  What we show in the current study 
differs in being evidence of altercentric encoding (Samson et al., 2010), i.e. encoding of the discrepant other-
perspective.  This sensitivity has never been shown before between representations of how something looks 
(level-2 perspective-taking).  
 
This study presents an example of how testing using second person perspective situations (Schillbach et al., 
2012) can add to our knowledge of social interaction and perspective-taking.  Schillbach and colleagues 
characterise second person perspective-taking tasks as those in which participants actively engage with another 
person, often involving emotions and joint goals or representations.  Previous work has shown that a stimulus 
containing a cartoon avatar is not enough to induce sensitivity to someone else’s perspective (Surtees et al., 
2012; Surtees et al, under review).  Surtees et al. (under review) showed that whilst adults suffered a cost of 
switching between their own perspective and someone else’s, when they completed single blocks of only their 
own perspective, they could ignore the presence of the avatar.  Here, using a real life partner, adults showed 
measurable costs when perspectives differed.  It is important to note that in the current new task participants 
never had to take their partner’s perspective.  What this suggests is that although interpreting how another 
person sees a given object may not be triggered simply by the presence of a social stimulus, it may be triggered 
by the right motivational circumstances.  This sensitivity to the other person’s point of view had no relevance to 
task demands and actively harmed performance when perspectives were in conflict.  These findings are an 
important complement to evidence that level-2 perspective-taking is not automatic by default (Surtees et al, 
2012; Surtees et al., under review).  They suggest that a team context leads to spontaneous perspective-taking, 
which will assist with inter-personal co-ordination, but potentially incur a cost to judgements in which such co-
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ordination is irrelevant.  Similarly, the findings raise new questions about the development of perspective-taking 
(Flavell et al., 1981 Apperly & Butterfill, 2009).  Interpreting someone else’s level-2 perspective explicitly is 
relatively demanding, and slow to develop.  However, the current findings suggest that once this ability is 
established it may then become recruited unintentionally, conditional on social cues such as a team context.  
This suggests that the development of adult-like perspective-taking may be much more protracted than 
developmental psychologists have typically recognised. 
 
If Experiment 1 shows the discovery of an intriguing new finding, Experiments 2 and 3 go further to elaborate 
the conditions in which this process occurs.  Experiment 2 demonstrates the necessity of our partner already 
having actively participated in the task.  This confirms that it is not the biophysical features of another person 
that prompts us to take their perspective, but rather the context in which we act.  In one sense this seems 
surprising.  In the current case, this perspective-taking holds no purpose and actively hinders performance on 
inconsistent trials, therefore we should avoid doing so if we can.  Under a traditional modular information 
processing framework (Fodor, 2001), the fact that we do not would suggest that this process is triggered outside 
of cognitive control.  Having such processes occur is thought to provide overall efficiency, through the 
constraints under which it operates; specific inputs being associated with specific outputs.  This is not the case, 
here, however, where the moment by moment input is the same, but we only observe the effect when a joint 
history is apparent.  Under a static information processing model this is not what we should expect.  One 
explanation for this could be through understanding interactions as dynamic systems.  Dale, Fusaroli, Duran & 
Richardson (2013, p 78) suggest that “Perspective-taking might be seen as part of this synergic process, shifting 
from allo- to egocentric or vice versa, as the interlocutors enact or develop coordinative routines”.  The broader 
suggestion is that as individuals cooperate, they prove to be efficient interactors by jointly constraining their 
behaviour.  By operating thus, the degrees of freedom within the interaction are reduced, in comparison to open-
ended models through which process reflects events, regardless of context.  These joint constraints may be 
triggered by observing another person engaging in a common task.  A second alternative could be that observing 
another person complete the task promotes taking their perspective (Furlanetto, Cavallo, Manera, , Tversky, & 
Becchio, 2013).  This perspective-taking may carry over from observing them completing the task to completing 
our own task.  One way to distinguish between the two alternatives would be to facilitate joint engagement 
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without observation, perhaps through partners gaining a reward for joint performance or completing an 
irrelevant task as a team. 
 
Experiment 3 shows that we represent the other’s perspective on a stimulus aspect which is relevant to our own 
task goal but to which the other person is not currently attending and has never done during the course of the 
experiment.  However, what we cannot disentangle yet is whether we only take into account the stimulus aspect 
relevant to us or whether we take into account some or all the other aspects.  First, it is possible that each partner 
only takes into account the stimulus aspect that is relevant for his own task goal and represents this aspect from 
both his and his partner’s perspective.  The motive for perspective-taking would be here more self-directed. 
Hence, the team member who does the magnitude judgement will care about the number identity from his and 
that of the partner’s perspective even if the partner’s goal has nothing to do with magnitude.  This would explain 
why that team member finds it harder to judge the magnitude of numbers like 6 and 9 which are seen differently 
from the partner’s perspective than numbers like 5 and 8.  The team member who judges the surface feature of 
the number will focus on whether the number is spotted or plain and consider that from his perspective and the 
perspective of his partner, but because there is no difference in how the surface feature appears to one or the 
other partner in our design, there would be no effect of number magnitude.  The second interpretation is that 
when we take the other person’s perspective spontaneously, we do it for all stimulus aspects (irrespective as to 
which is relevant to whom).  That means that if the joint task setting requires separate task goals (one partner 
judges the number magnitude, the other judges whether the number is spotted or plain), both partners represent 
the stimulus according to the two task goals.  Hence, the team member who judges the magnitude takes into 
account how the partner sees the numerosity and the surface feature.  Likewise, the team member who judges 
the superficial features takes into account how the partner sees the surface feature and the numerosity.  This 
could be due to the fact that it is difficult to dissociate the two stimulus aspects or because the partners really 
care about the two task goals.  This interpretation would explain why the team member performing the 
magnitude judgement is influenced by how the partner sees the number even when numerosity is not part of the 
partner’s task goal.  The interpretation is also compatible with the pattern of performance of the team member 
who performs the surface feature judgement.  It may simply mean that representing incompatible aspects on the 
number stimuli did not affect the decision time on the surface feature task.  
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Disentangling these two interpretations is an interesting avenue for future research. In the meantime, it can 
however be concluded that spontaneous perspective-taking occurs even for stimulus aspects that the partner is 
not attending to. 
 
Facilitation vs Interference. 
The literature on social facilitation posits a role for the presence of engaged others acting to improve our task 
performance on some tasks and diminish it on others (Aiello & Douthwitt, 2001; Shteynberg, 2010).  On the 
other hand, the literature on “altercentric” effects in perspective-taking has, more commonly, interpreted these 
effects rather differently (Kovács et al., 2010; Samson et al., 2010).  That is, that they result from interference 
when perspectives are different.  Another underlying mechanism for this could be that poor performance on 
inconsistent trials could come from a “social psychological refractory period”, Liepelt and Prinz (2011), such 
that a bottleneck in processing occurs when a task is shared across two individuals (similar to what occurs in 
dual task paradigms).  
Our results cannot draw a clear distinction between the two interpretations.  In spite of the interaction between 
conditions and consistency, there were no significant differences found between groups on independent analysis 
of consistent and inconsistent conditions on any of the experiments.  This is likely because the design of the 
experiments meant that these comparisons were made between subjects and thus had to take into account 
individual differences in factors such as number processing and motor coordination.  Such comparisons would 
also need to be interpreted in the light of global facilitation effects between joint and alone conditions, 
regardless of perspective difference, as well as local facilitation effects when perspectives were consistent.  We 
believe that distinguishing whether the effects herein result from facilitation or distraction would merit an 
exciting future line of research (the same could, in fact, be said for many altercentric effects, Samson et al., 
2010; Kovács et al., 2010).  The most obvious way for this using our paradigm would be to include numbers 
that do not look like another number if inverter, such as the number 4.  A facilitation account would predict 4s to 
elicit the same performance as 6s, that is, slower than 8s.  An interference account would predict 4s to elicit the 
same performance as 8s, that is better than 6s. 
 
Conclusion 
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In sum, we present the first evidence of people being spontaneously sensitive to a shared or conflicting 
perspective of how an object looks to another person. This suggests that when performing a task together people 
either make sacrifices to the performance of their own task to allow them to understand others better or incur a 
cost-free benefit when perspectives happen to converge.  This occurs under the limiting condition that the 
partner has previously shown an active role in the task but extends to situations where the partner is not 
attending to the relevant stimulus aspect. 
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